Nuclear Smuggling

Smuggling of Nuclear Material Over the past five years the former states of the Soviet Union haven¹t been able to prevent the leakage of nuclear material. Nuclear materials and technologies are more accessible now than at any other time in history, due to the breakup of the Soviet Union and the worsening of economic conditions. No longer does the Soviet KGB, the Soviet military and the Soviet border guards have the control to stop the smuggling of nuclear material¹s. With the Cold War being over, there is a huge stockpile of over 100 nuclear sites (See Appendix A). Russia, alone has an inventory of 1,300 tons of highly enriched uranium (HEU), and 165 tons of weapon usable plutonium. Such material is coming into high demand on the market. Terrorist, organized crime and countries with nuclear ambition, are high bid contenders for the material. The United States is also becoming involved for the safety of preventing a nuclear disaster. The U.S. has just begun their large task and with Russia¹s worsening economy, smuggling of nuclear material will continue. During the Cold War the security of Soviet nuclear weapons and missile materials was based on a highly centralized military system and operating within a strong political authority. The workers back then where well disciplined and each individual new his/her role. The workers were among the best treated and loyal to the Russian military. They are now suffering hardships and are forced to scavenge anything to pay for their food, rent and social services. A new trend is already occurring with some of the workers . There are those that will seek employment out of the nuclear field and in the commercial sector, where salaries are higher. Then the unfortunate who lose their jobs and find no work. The scarier thought is that the uncontempt people in Russia¹s nuclear complex with access to nuclear materials will sell themselves, to make a quick buck. Most suppliers of nuclear material, were insiders who had worked or were then working at nuclear research institutes or naval bases. Most perpetrators had no customers in hand but new that a quick profit existed (See Appendix B). The first confirmed case involving the diversion of HEU occurred at the Luch Scientific Production Association in Podolsk. Between May and September of 1992, Leonid Smirnov, a chemical engineer stole approximately 1.5 Kg of weapon grade HEU. He recovered the enriched Uranium in the form of a uranium dioxide powder, and stored it in his apartment balcony. He was apparently motivated by an article on the fortune in selling HEU. On October 9, 1992 he was apprehended at a Podolsk railroad. Under Article 223 he was sentenced for three years. The largest quantity of weapon-usuable nuclear material smuggled outside Russia was found in Prague, Czech Republic on Dec. 14, 1994. Two canisters of HEU enriched to 87.79% U-235 was found in the car of Jaroslav Vagner. Vagner had worked at several power stations at Dukovany and Temelin and he left due to poor wages. His arrest came, due to an anonymous telephone tip. The list of potential proliferations exist in the state, separatist and terrorist groups and organize crime. Many countries are looking for critical components for their nuclear weapons program. Finding a material would shorten the time in producing a nuclear weapon. For instance, Iran is actively pursuing nuclear weapon capability. They¹re attempting to develop both plutonium and HEC. In 1992 Iran unsuccessfully approached the Ulba Metallurgical Plant and in 1993 three Iranians belonging to intelligence service were arrested in Turkey while seeking to acquire smuggled nuclear material. The CIA, John Deutch estimates: ³Iran is a couple of years away from producing a nuclear weapon.² Iran¹s neighbor Iraq continues its nuclear program after being significantly damaged from Operation Desert Storm and continued U.N sanctions. The CIA assess that Iraq would take any opportunity to buy nuclear weapons materials. They have already tried but failed in one incident. In 1994, Jordanian authorities intercepted a shipment of sophisticated Russian produced missile guidance instruments, bound to Iraq. Another country, Libya with nuclear weapons ambitions, currently operates a Soviet supplied research center near Tripoli. President Qadhafi is said to be recruiting nuclear scientist to aide in developing nuclear weapons. Terrorist are also potential buyers for radioactive materials. They could use it to contaminate water supplies, business centers or government facilities. Terrorist are categorized into Traditional terrorist that would remain hesitant to use nuclear weapons in fear of a crackdown of their supporters then the multinational terrorist which are motivated by revenge, religious fevor and hatred for the west. On March 20, 1995 the Japanese cult Aum Shinrikyo attacked some Japanese civilians with deadly gas. The terrorist group had also tride to mine its own uranium in Australia. Organized crime is a powerful and pervasive force in Russia. The CIA estimates 200 large sophisticated criminal organized operations. They¹ve established international smuggling networks and have connections to governmental officials. The access to nuclear weapons is easily available due to the connections they¹ve established. The smuggling of nuclear material out of Russia has become proratable to the low income worker as well as to the benefit of terrorist, organism crime and nuclear research centers. There exist no security at most of the nuclear facilities and so apprehending the material is quit easy. More cases of unsuccessful attempts are becoming known to the media, but any successful attempts the government, both Russia and the U.S have decline to answer. If left unchecked it may even escalate to the complex level of drug smuggling.